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 Unemployment and Endogenous Growth
Anton B. T. M. Van Schaik – Henri L. F. De Groot
Abstract. In this paper we develop a two-sector endogenous growth model with a
dual labour market, based on efficiency wages. Growth is driven by intentional R&D
performed in the high-tech and high-wage sector. How a change in rivalry among
firms affects simultaneously growth and unemployment is examined. On the one
hand, an increase of the elasticity of substitution between the product varieties of
different high-tech firms reduces market power and leads to higher growth but
reduces job prospects. On the other hand, if barriers to entry exist, an increase of
the number of rivals in the market (due to removal of entry barriers) leads to lower
growth, whereas the effect on aggregate employment is ambiguous.
1. Introduction
Empirical evidence strongly suggests that wages differ
considerably across broad sectors of the economy, even after
controlling for age, education, occupation, gender and workplace
characteristics (cf. OECD 1994, p. 28). There are certain common
elements across the estimates of these differences for a number of
countries, e.g., manufacturing pre-eminently being the large sector
paying a relatively high non-competitive wage premium, whereas the
agricultural sector pays the lowest wage. Moreover, evidence reveals
that the wage premia are relatively stable over time (cf. Krueger and
Summers 1988).
The apparent willingness of employers in imperfectly competitive
product-markets to share rents with their workers introduces
frictions in the market mechanism: the unemployed may prolong
their job search in the hope of entering high-wage sectors and
workers displaced from these sectors may have very high
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replacement rates and hence reservation wages when benefits are
based on previous earnings (cf. Kletzer 1992). This implies that
equilibrium unemployment may be negatively related to the degree
of competition in the product market. This idea is prominent in The
OECD Jobs Study (cf. OECD 1994, p. 23 and 53), where it is
proposed that: ‘‘Establishing a competitive environment could,
therefore, improve job prospects by both eliminating wage premia
and encouraging output expansion.’’ The main purpose of the
present paper is to see whether tougher competition in imperfectly
competitive product-markets can indeed foster aggregate
employment and growth at the same time.
In the project for this paper, we have developed an endogenous
growth model with a traditional and a high-tech sector. The model
predicts that relative nominal wages are rigid to a great extent.
Labour is homogeneous, but employers in the high-tech sector are
willing to pay efficiency wages for rent-sharing reasons. Thus,
workers obtain a sector-specific wage rate. The presence of a dual
labour market, due to an efficiency wage relation that is operating in
one sector only, is an important characteristic of the model. The
concept of efficiency wages has been studied widely.1 What all these
models have in common is that they can be used to explain the
existence of involuntary unemployment. The mechanism underlying
all these models is that there is a reason for a (profit-maximizing)
firm to pay a wage that is higher than the wage that clears the
labour market. The reason for this is either to retain (Salop, 1979),
to recruit (Stiglitz, 1976, Weiss, 1980) or to motivate (Akerlof, 1982,
Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) workers. Within this last class of models,
there are again different explanations. Akerlof (1982) gives a
sociological explanation and deals with ‘‘fairness’’. He assumes that
workers have a norm of a fair day’s work and by paying a higher
wage, this norm can be increased by the firm. Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984), on the other hand, assume that firms pay a high wage in
order to prevent workers from shirking in the event that the
monitoring system does not work properly. Because the firm is
willing to pay a wage that is higher than the market-clearing-wage,
there exists an equilibrium in which there are workers willing to
work at a lower wage than the wage paid by the firm. Nevertheless,
these workers are not employed because it is not in the interest of
the profit-maximizing firm to hire them. That is why unemployment
can be said to be involuntary.
In the product markets, we assume perfect competition in the
market for traditional goods and monopolistic competition in the
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market for high-tech goods. Growth is driven by research done in
the high-tech sector. Technological progress in this sector stems
from intentional activities undertaken by the private firms. It seems
to be rather well established that this activity (innovation, as the
outcome of intentional activities in private firms) is one of the most
important sources of technological progress in OECD economies
(cf. Dosi, 1988, Fagerberg, 1994). Recently, Smulders and Van de
Klundert (1995) have incorporated the accumulation of firm-specific
knowledge in a general equilibrium two-sector endogenous growth
model in which labour is fully employed. We follow these authors in
the general set-up of the model, and by assuming that knowledge is
(at least partly) internal to the firm. However, in contrast with these
authors, we let labour market institutions and thus equilibrium
unemployment play a dominant role in the model. This enables us
to put the relation between unemployment and endogenous growth
into the foreground. Up till now, this topic has hardly been touched
upon in theoretical growth literature.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Consumers
maximize utility, which leads to the warranted rate of growth. High-
tech firms maximize the discounted value of the firm, which results
in the planned rate of growth. In general equilibrium, the planned
rate of growth equals the warranted rate of growth. Workers can be
employed in one of the two sectors or they can be unemployed. The
labour market is in equilibrium if the unemployed are indifferent
between accepting a low-paid job in the traditional sector on the one
hand, and remaining unemployed and waiting till a high-paid job in
the high-tech sector becomes vacant on the other hand.
Section 3 presents a general equilibrium steady-state analysis,
focusing on two cases of tougher competition. The first case is an
increase of the price elasticity of demand of high-tech goods,
induced by an exogenous change in consumer preferences. The
second case deals with the effects on employment and growth of
tougher competition after removing (exogenously given)
institutionally determined barriers to entry in the market for high-
tech products. Both cases are interesting on their own, but the
second case may also be interesting from an economic policy point
of view. We conclude in section 4.
2. The model
The economy comprises two sectors. There is perfect competition
in the product market for traditional goods and monopolistic
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competition in the product market for high-tech goods. Each firm in
the high-tech sector produces a unique brand of the high-tech
goods. There are n high-tech firms, indexed i\1, . . . , n. We assume
that a high-tech firm holds only a negligible small market share, so
that competition is monopolistically a` la Chamberlin. Labour is
homogeneous and can be employed in one of the two sectors or can
be unemployed. Workers earn a sector-specific wage, while
unemployed people get an unemployment benefit. In this section we
will state the full model. Only the equations constituting the final
model are numbered. Where no confusion arises, time indices are
omitted.
2.1. Consumers
According to standard optimizing behaviour of consumers,
individuals maximize intertemporal utility2
U0\h
l
0
c1µrt µ1
1µr
eµytdt,
where c is a composite good, 1/r is the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution and y is the subjective discount rate. Consumers have
Cobb-Douglas preferences over the two goods3
c\XsY1µs, 0sss1,
where Y is the traditional good and X is a bundle of varieties of the
high-tech good. In addition, consumers have CES-preferences over
the high-tech goods. Thus, X is defined as (cf. Dixit and Stiglitz,
1977, Krugman, 1990, Chapter 9)
X\C+
n
i\1
xi(eµ1)/eD
e/(eµ1)
, ea1.
xi represents the consumed quantity of the high-tech good of brand
i, and e is the elasticity of substitution between any two high-tech
goods. The maximization problem is solved with a three step
procedure. The first constraint to this problem is
A˙t\rt At+wtµctPct.
This constraint describes the development of wealth A over time.
The dot over A represents a derivative with respect to time
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(A˙t\dAt /dt). Consumers spend income on consumption cPc and
obtain income by working, yielding a sector specific wage income, w,
and by receiving rental income, rA, over financial assets accumulated
in the past. The second constraint is
XPX+YPY\cPc,
stating that consumption expenditure cPc is divided among the two
types of goods that are available in the economy. The third
constraint is
+
n
i\1
xipxi\PXX,
stating that consumers divide the spending on the high-tech goods
over the n available varieties. In these formulations, Pc is the
macroeconomic price index, PX is the price index of the bundle of
high-tech goods, PY is the price of the traditional good and pxi is the
price of a single brand of the high-tech good of variety i.
Performing the three step maximization procedure finally leaves
us with five equations. In the first step consumers decide how to
divide total income between savings and consumption expenditure.
This yields the Ramsey rule
i
c
\
1
r Crµ
P˙c
Pc
µyD . (1)
This equation relates the growth rate of consumption to the
determinants of the consumption-savings decision. It shows that the
rate of growth is high if the real return on savings (rµP˙c /Pc) is large,
if consumers are patient (y is low) and if consumers are willing to
substitute intertemporally (1/r is high).
In the second step consumers decide how to divide the income
they want to spend on consumption expenditures between high-tech
and traditional goods. Given the Cobb-Douglas specification chosen
above this results in
YPY
1µs
\cPc or
YPY
XPX
\
1µs
s
, (2)
where
Pc\A
PX
s B
1µs
A
PY
1µsB
1µs
. (3)
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Eq. 2 tells us that a fixed fraction 1µs of aggregate consumption
expenditure cPc is spent on traditional goods and a fixed fraction s
is spent on high-tech goods. Eq. 3 is the definition of the
macroeconomic price index.
In the last step consumers decide how to divide the income they
want to spend on high-tech goods among the n varieties of this good
that are available. This yields the demand for a single variety of the
high-tech good
xi\X A
pxi
PXB
µe
, (4)
where
PX\C+
n
i\1
pxi1µeD
1/(1µe)
. (5)
The price-elasticity of demand for any variety of the high-tech good
is thus equal to e. From now on we employ the assumption of
symmetry across firms in the high-tech sector, so that we may drop
the subscript i. Hence, X\xne/(eµ1) and n\XPX/xpx. Notice that,
after employing the symmetry assumption, the equation for the
circular flow (2) can be written as YPY/nxpx\(1µs)/s.
2.2. Firms
The traditional sector exhibits unitary labour-productivity
Y\LY. (6)
LY stands for the number of workers employed in this sector and Y
is the production of traditional goods. Under perfect competition,
the price of a traditional good equals labour-costs
PY\wY, (7)
where wY denotes the wage rate in the traditional sector.
High-tech firms employ direct labour Lx, with labour productivity
h and efficiency e, to produce x units of output
x\ehLx. (8)
According to this equation, the overall productivity of direct labour
x/Lx is composed out of two factors, each of which is determined
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differently. With respect to the efficiency e we assume, following
Akerlof (1982), that the efficiency of a worker in the high-tech
sector depends on the wage he earns, wx, related to the wage a
worker earns in the traditional sector, wY,
e\µa+cC
wx
wYD
g
, where 0sgs1, caaa0. (9)
We will call this the supply of effort. The reasons why this efficiency
wage relation is only operating in the high-tech sector can be
various. One may assume that it is because of imperfect monitoring
possibilities in the high-tech sector or because of rent-sharing
reasons. As profits are made in the high-tech sector only, workers
may find it fair to share in the profits and hence ask for a higher
wage. In that case it may be in the interest of the profit-maximizing
firm to offer a higher wage.4 The importance of institutional and
organizational factors for the effort of workers has been stressed in
(historical) studies on the relation between economic institutions
and economic performance. The following passage (Lazonick, 1991,
p. 35) is instructive:
To overcome restrictions of output and encourage workers to
apply their effort to further the goals of the enterprise, employers
had to assure the workers that promises of higher wages, better
work conditions, and employment stability would be kept. Most
capable of keeping such promises were those corporations that
had already attained competitive advantage in their product
markets. It was these corporations that were already generating
value gains that could be shared with workers to an extent that
other, less advantaged corporations could not. The most effective
way to implement these incentives was by promising hard-
working, loyal workers long-term employment security and a
rising standard of living both on and off the job.
The variable h on the other hand can be affected by the firm by
doing R&D. Assuming there is no uncertainty with respect to
investment in knowledge, employing Lr units of research labour
yields an increase in technology equal to
h˙\jKLr,
where K stands for the stock of knowledge a firm possesses. In the
following we will assume for simplicity that K\h, so
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h˙h
\jLr. (10)
This assumption implies that knowledge is completely internal to the
firm. Alternatively, we could assume that knowledge is only partly
internal to the firm. (This can easily be worked out, but turns out
not to affect the main results; see footnote 11.5) Finally, firms have
to incur a (traditional) fixed cost Lf before being able to produce.
This fixed cost is expressed in terms of labour and is exogenous.
In maximizing present discounted value, high-tech firms decide
about labour input in the production department Lx, labour input in
the research department Lr, and the wage rate wx. This optimization
finally leaves us with four equations (see Appendix A).6
The first equation shows the wage setting behaviour. Firms will
pay higher wages as long as the increase in benefits related to the
increase in efficiency more than offsets the increase in costs in the
form of a higher wage bill. This comes down to what we will call the
modified Solow condition
g(e+a)
e A\
qe
qwx
wx
e B\
Lx+Lr+Lf
Lx
. (11)
According to the standard Solow condition the wage elasticity of
effort should equal one. This conclusion is however based on a
model in which fixed labour (and also research labour) plays no role
(e.g. Schmidt-Sørensen, 1990). This explains the difference between
the standard and the modified Solow condition, where the wage
elasticity of effort exceeds one.
The second equation describes price-setting-behaviour. Given the
market power high-tech firms have, they will simply put a mark-up
over their wage costs
px\
e
eµ1 
wx
eh
. (12)
This relation shows that real wages in the high-tech sector wx/px
increase with labour productivity h. Unit real labour costs wx/ehpx
equal (eµ1)/e and are therefore invariant with respect to labour
productivity growth. The mark-up is inversely related to the
elasticity of substitution between any two high-tech goods. The
closer these goods form substitutes, i.e., the higher e, the less market
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power firms have and the lower the mark-up they can put on labour
costs.
The third equation determines the optimal research effort
wx\phjh. (13)
In this formulation ph is the shadow price of the level of technology
h. It is a measure of the marginal value of an additional unit of h for
the firm. According to this equation, a firm equalizes the marginal
revenue of doing research (consisting of an increase in the level of
technology a firm can use) with the marginal costs of R&D, i.e., the
wage bill of a research worker. Combining the eqs. 12 and 13 leads
to
ph
px
\
e
j 
eµ1
e
.
This relation shows that the price (of the input) of knowledge in
terms of the price (of the output) of the final product will rise if it
becomes relatively costly to generate new knowledge (j is low), if
the efficiency of production workers increases and if high-tech goods
form closer substitutes (higher e).
Finally, we derive the dynamic equation
r\jLr+eLx
px
ph
eµ1
e
+
p˙h
ph
. (14)
According to this equation, the marginal cost of an increase in h,
which consists of capital costs r, should equal the marginal revenue
of an increase in h, which consists of an addition to the stock of
knowledge, an increase of production and a capital gains term, p˙h /ph.
If there is free entry and exit, the number of high-tech firms is
endogenous. The number of firms is determined by the profit
opportunities that are left in the (total) market after individual firms
have outweighed the costs and benefits of investing in knowledge on
the one hand with the costs and benefits of demanding effort on the
other hand. In equilibrium, no firm earns a profit. Assuming that all
firms, i.e., new and incumbent firms, are symmetrical, the zero profit
condition comes down to
pxx\wx(Lx+Lr+Lf). (15)
This equation determines the number of firms. If this condition does
not hold, for instance due to barriers to entry, the number of firms
is an exogenous variable.
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2.3. Labour
In the labour-market there are three states in which a person can
be: he can be employed in one of the two sectors or he can be
unemployed. Thus, the labour constraint can be written as
L\LY+LT+U, (16)
where U is the number of people being unemployed and L is the
labour force (which is exogenous and constant). The unemployed
receive an unemployment-benefit that is a fraction b of the wage in
the traditional sector. Consequently, the nominal unemployment
benefit equals bwY. This benefit is paid out of lump-sum taxes on
labour income so that it does not affect consumer’s optimizing
behaviour. It is assumed that the net real wage in the traditional
sector is higher than the real unemployment benefit, so that the
unemployment benefit b must be sufficiently smaller than 1.
The number of people working in the high-tech sector equals
LT\n(Lx+Lr+Lf). (17)
In principle, all people prefer to work in the high-wage sector as
they strive for the highest possible pay-off. However, given the
structure of aggregate demand and the operation of the efficiency
wage relation not everybody can be employed in that sector. Those
people that are not employed in the high-wage sector face two
alternative opportunities. They can either choose to be unemployed
or they can choose to accept a job in the traditional sector. We
assume here that, although the pay-off is higher in the traditional
sector than in the pool of unemployed, there are people that choose
to be unemployed and queue for high-wage jobs.7 This may be
because it is more difficult to find a job in the high-tech sector when
working in the traditional sector or because there are negative status
effects from working in the traditional sector (see e.g. Layard et al.
1991). The implication of this is that there is a reason for people to
be unemployed and accepting a relatively low pay.
The probability that an unemployed person will get a job in the
high-tech sector equals dLT/U. Here, d stands for the (exogenously
given) quit-rate in the high-tech sector (which is composed of the
chance of being fired, the chance of retiring, etc.).8 The numerator
of this expression describes the number of high-paid jobs that falls
free in every period. The denominator gives the number of people
that is waiting for such a job. In (labour market) equilibrium it must
hold that people are indifferent between accepting a job in the
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traditional sector on the one hand and being unemployed with a
chance of getting a high-wage job on the other hand. This
equilibrium condition looks like
wY\
dLT
U
wx+A1µ
dLT
U B bwY,
where the LHS of this expression is the pay-off when working in the
traditional sector and the RHS is the expected pay-off if one
chooses not to work in the traditional sector. Thus the equilibrium
unemployment ratio in the high-tech sector equals
D=
U
LT
\
d(wµb)
1µb
, w=
wx
wY
. (18)
This relation shows that there is a positive relation between the
unemployment ratio in the high-tech sector on the one hand and the
relative wage, the unemployment benefit and the lay-off rate in the
high-tech sector on the other hand. This relation could be further
based on micro-economic behaviour, but this is not needed for the
purpose of this paper.9 Crucial for this paper is the positive relation
between the rate of unemployment in the high-tech sector and the
relative wage.
We have now specified both the consumer and producer side and
the labour market of the model, so that we are able to characterize
the solution of the model. The conditions for an economically
meaningful solution are
wx
wY
a1,
h˙
h
, na0.
In total, we are left with a system of 18 equations and 24 unknowns,
namely n, c, c˙, P˙c, Pc, r, Y, PY, PX, LY, wY, x, h, h˙, e, Lx, wx, Lr, px, ph,
p˙h, LT, U and X. The system can be solved after defining a nume´raire
(alternatively, we could solve the model in relative prices) and after
taking into account the definitions for the growth rates that link the
levels of consumption, the price index of consumption, the level of
technology and the shadow price of the level of technology with
their respective growth rates. The system jumps to a steady-state
growth equilibrium as there are no predetermined rigidities and as
there are constant returns to scale with respect to knowledge (cf.
Smulders and Van de Klundert 1995).
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3. Comparative statics
In this section, we will first characterize the properties of the
steady-state equilibrium of the complete model. Thereafter, we will
compare the free entry equilibrium that is characterized by zero-
profits in the high-tech sector with the blocked entry equilibrium,
where the number of firms is exogenous and profits are
non-negative. By comparing these equilibria, we are able to deduce
the effects on unemployment and growth of economic policies
aiming at strengthening the competitive forces in imperfectly
competitive products-markets. We start, for the moment, with the
assumption that the relative wage (wx/wY=w), the R&D
employment ratio (Lr/Lx=b) and the number of firms (n) are
exogenous. This allows us to depict the basic determinants of the
sectoral allocation of labour and serves as a preliminary step
towards the analysis of the complete model.
3.1. The allocation of labour
With w, b and n fixed, the model can easily be solved. Substituting
the expression for unemployment (18) into the labour constraint
(16) yields
LY\Lµ[1+D]LT. (A)
What this equation basically says is that a rise of employment in the
high-tech sector and the accompanied increase of the number of
unemployed people leaves less workers to be employed in the
traditional sector. In other words, labour supply in the traditional
sector is restricted by the difference between total labour supply and
labour supply in the high-tech sector. Labour supply in the high-tech
sector includes the number of people waiting for a job in that sector.
The second relation between LY and LT follows from substituting
the eqs. 6, 7, 8, 12 and 17 into eq. 2 and using Lr\bLx and the
symmetry assumption
LY\wP(LTµnLf), where P=
1µs
s
e
eµ1 
1
1+b
. (B)
This equation shows that, for the circular flow to be in equilibrium,
an increase of employment in the high-tech sector must be
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accompanied with an increase of employment in the traditional
sector. Equating A and B gives the full solution of the (simplified)
model in terms of LT.
It is instructive to derive the (preliminary) comparative static
results from a picture, which decomposes labour over employment
in the traditional sector, employment in the high-tech sector and
unemployment (see Figure 1). In the figure it holds that
tan(p)\wP and tan(n)\1+D.
The figure also depicts the full-employment line, describing all
possible divisions of labour over the two sectors for D\0. In this
case there is no reason for people to remain unemployed as no new
jobs will open up in the high-tech sector. If Da0, however, there is
unemployment. The level of unemployment is determined by
confronting the solution of the model, i.e., the intersection of line A
and line B (point E), with the full-employment line. In the figure, a
rise of the R&D employment ratio rotates line B around its
intercept with the LT-axis to the right, leading to the new
Figure 1.
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equilibrium point Ep. Employment in the high-tech sector increases,
whereas employment in the traditional sector decreases. On balance,
aggregate employment declines, because the number of jobs in the
high-tech sector is rising, so that waiting for a job in the high-tech
sector becomes more attractive than accepting a job in the
traditional sector. A similar reallocation of labour (higher
unemployment, lower employment in the traditional sector and
higher employment in the high-tech sector) results in a rise of the
number of firms (parallel shift of line B along the LT-axis to the
right).
The effect on unemployment of a rise of the relative wage is
ambiguous. A higher relative wage makes more people willing to
wait for a high-paid job, so that unemployment increases. (In the
figure line A turns clockwise around its intercept with the LY-axis).
A higher relative wage makes high-tech goods more expensive
relative to traditional goods, so that production shifts away from
high-tech goods towards traditional goods. (In the figure line B
rotates around its intercept with the LT-axis to the left.) This raises
employment in the traditional sector, whereas employment in the
high-tech sector falls. Unemployment also declines, because waiting
for a job in the high-tech sector becomes less attractive than
accepting a job in the traditional sector. Thus, a rise of the relative
wage has both a positive and a negative effect on unemployment.
For the complete model, it remains to be seen which effect
dominates.
Finally, we consider the effects of a rise of the elasticity of
substitution between any two high-tech goods e. This change in
consumer preferences strengthens competition between high-tech
firms. Traditional goods become more expensive relative to high-
tech goods, so that labour shifts from the traditional sector towards
the high-tech sector (in the figure line B rotates around its intercept
with the LT-axis to the right). On balance, aggregate employment
decreases for reasons discussed before. Economic growth is
enhanced. This is due to the increase of employment in the high-
tech sector, which (as b and n are fixed) induces a greater number
of research workers and thus a higher rate of growth of labour
productivity. It remains to be seen whether this result, i.e., the trade-
off between aggregate employment and growth by a change of the
price elasticity of high-tech goods, stands upright in the fully fledged
model, where b, w and n are no longer fixed. This will be the topic
of the remainder of this section.
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3.2. The free entry equilibrium
The free entry economy is characterized by the zero profit
condition (15)
px x\wx(Lx+Lr+Lf).
Using the production function (8) and the price equation (12), this
condition can be written as
e
eµ1
\
Lx+Lr+Lf
Lx
. (19)
The LHS is the mark-up over wage costs. In equilibrium, the mark-
up (minus 1) equals the fixed costs in terms of direct labour (i.e.
(Lr+Lf)/Lx). The same ratio between indirect and direct labour was
found in the RHS of the modified Solow condition (11). Thus,
equating the zero profit condition with the modified Solow condition
yields the equilibrium effort level
e\
ga
e/(eµ1)µg
. (20)
Combining this with the supply of effort (9), yields the equilibrium
relative wage
w=
wx
wY
\2 ac A1µ(eµ1)ge B3
1/g
(21)
This expression reveals that the relative wage is rigid to a great
extent. It only depends on the parameters of the efficiency wage
relation and the mark-up. The relation between w and e is positive,
which will be explained later on (see Table 1).
We now will derive the full solution of the model. To start with,
notice that in the steady state it holds per definition that
g=
h˙
h
\
x˙
x
\
X˙
X
and 0=
Y˙
Y
.
Labour productivity in the high-tech sector grows at a constant rate,
denoted by g. Output of high-tech goods also grows at rate g, while
output of traditional goods is constant. In addition, from the eqs. 2
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and 3 it can be derived that the steady-state circular flow
equilibrium is characterized by
g\
P˙Y
pY
µ
p˙x
px
\
1
1µs A
P˙c
Pc
µ
p˙x
pxB\
1
s 
c˙
c
.
Since consumers spend a constant fraction s on high-tech goods, the
macroeconomic rate of growth is sg, whereas the relative price PY/px
increases at the rate g. Taking the price of the traditional good as a
nume´raire (PY\1), this implies that the price of a high-tech good
decreases at the rate g.
Further, notice that for firms the real rate of interest comes down
to
rx\rµ
p˙h
ph
.
In equilibrium ph/px is a fixed ratio, so that the growth rate of the
price of the input of knowledge equals the growth rate of the price
of output of high-tech products. This implies that the equilibrium
real rate of interest can be written as
rx\r+g. (22)
Another expression for the real rate of interest is found by
substituting the eqs. 12 and 13 into eq. 14. The result is
rx\j (Lx+Lr). (23)
Using the definition of the growth rate g, the production function of
the research department (10) is now written as
Lr\
g
j
. (24)
Combining the eqs. 22, 23 and 24 yields
b=
Lr
Lx
\
g
r
. (25)
This equation shows the equilibrium R&D employment ratio as the
present value of the steady-state rate of growth. Alternatively, using
eq. 24, this relation can be written as
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Lx\
r
j
, (26)
which reveals that the equilibrium productivity of direct labour
(1/Lx) equals the present value of the (exogenously determined)
productivity of research labour. Substitution of this equation into
the zero profit condition (19) then results in the following
expression for the size of the individual firm
Lx+Lr+Lf\
e
eµ1 
r
j
. (27)
The size of the firm will be larger, the higher the rate of interest.
Obviously, this is connected with the fact that high-tech firms have
to cover investment in knowledge and other fixed costs. Investment
decisions lead to the planned rate of growth, which follows after
substituting the eqs. 24 and 26 into 27 as
g\
rµ(eµ1)jLf
eµ1
. (28)
The planned rate of growth depends positively on rµ(eµ1)jLf,
which measures the attractiveness of investment for firms.
Consumers, on the other hand, decide to save. Substituting the
expression for the steady-state equilibrium into the Ramsey rule (1),
we get the warranted rate of growth
g\
rµy
s(rµ1)
. (29)
The warranted growth rate depends positively on rµy, which
measures the attractiveness of savings for consumers.
In equilibrium, the planned rate of growth equals the warranted
rate of growth, which yields the following relations for the
equilibrium rate of growth
g\
(eµ1)jLfµy
s(rµ1)+1µe
, (30)
and the equilibrium rate of interest
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r\
(eµ1)s(rµ1)jLfµ(eµ1)y
s(rµ1)+1µe
. (31)
Notice that the equilbrium rate of growth does not depend on the
size of the labour force L. The solution is depicted in Figure 2. For
an economically meaningful steady-state equilibrium, it can be
reasoned that the slope of the line for the warranted rate of growth
has to be smaller than the slope of the line for the planned rate of
growth and that the point of intersection must guarantee that
raga0. The first inequality that guarantees this is a condition for
the stability of the model and comes down to
s(rµ1)+1ae.
As ea1, this condition implies in addition that ra1.10 (The
intertemporal elasticity of substitution should be smaller than one,
which gives an upper bound to the warranted rate of growth.) The
second inequality ensures that the rate of growth is positive and
comes down to
Figure 2.
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(eµ1)jLfay.
This condition will hold for a sufficiently large value of traditional
fixed cost Lf. Taken together, these conditions imply that
s(rµ1)jLfay. Using these conditions it follows from Figure 2 that
both the equilibrium rate of growth and the equilibrium rate of
interest depend positively on e, j and Lf and negatively on r, y and
s.11
The equilibrium rate of growth does not depend on parameters
from the side of the labour market in the model. In other words, in
the free entry equilibrium, the growth rate does not depend on the
relative wage. Although the wage rate is an instrument for the firm
that is chosen optimally to maximize profits, it is basically a variable
that is fully determined in connection with the size of the firm.
Nevertheless, the relative wage is an important determinant of the
sectoral allocation of labour and consequently of the concentration
ratio in the market for high-tech products. This can be seen from
the complete solution of the model.12 Here it suffices to give the
outcome for the equilibrium number of unemployed13
U\
L
1+
1
D
+
1µs
s
w
D
. (32)
This relation reveals that U/L depends positively on D (and via
we; the term w/D depends negatively on w). Thus, in addition to the
positive relation between the relative wage and the rate of
unemployment in the high-tech sector (which characterizes labour
market equilibrium), in general equilibrium we find a positive
relation between the relative wage and the absolute number of
unemployed people. Table 1 gives a complete overview of the
comparative static results. These can be derived in a straightforward
manner, taking into account the stability condition and the condition
for a positive growth rate. The table gives rise to the following
conclusions.
There is a negative relation between economic growth, g, and the
number of firms, n. This is explained as follows. Before being able to
produce, high-tech firms have to incur traditional fixed costs. In
addition, to keep their position in the market, firms have to invest in
R&D, which is also a fixed cost. Large fixed costs limit the
possibility of making profits. The larger the fixed cost, the smaller is
the ‘‘room’’ for firms with non-negative profits. This restricts the
number of firms. Thus, the larger the fixed cost, the larger the size
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of the individual firm and the more is each firm able to afford a
large research department and to grow fast.
There is no relation between the rate of growth and the size of
the labour force L and the unemployment benefit b. An increase of
the labour force leads to an equiproportionate rise of the number of
firms, so that the ratio between economy-wide traditional fixed costs
and total labour (nLf/L) does not change. A more generous
unemployment benefit system increases the attractiveness of being
unemployed, which restricts effective supply of labour (LµU) and
therefore the number of high-tech firms. As can be seen from the
number of production workers Lx, the size of the firm does not
change, so that total employment in the high-tech sector declines.
The rate of growth is negatively related to the willingness to
smooth consumption over time r and the discount rate y. The
higher r, the less people are prepared to save now in exchange for
future consumpion. This lowers the warranted rate of growth.
Incumbent firms will adapt the planned rate of growth to the lower
level of savings by investing less in knowledge. Profits will therefore
become positive and these will attract new firms until a new zero
profit equilibrium is reached. The size of the firm decreases as can
be seen from the lower number of production and research workers
Lx. The increase of the number of firms exactly compensates the
decrease of employment of the individual firm, so that total
employment in the high-tech sector does not change. There is
therefore no (additional) incentive for people to wait until a high-
paid job falls free, so that aggregate employment does not change
Table 1. Comparative static results (free entry equilibrium)
n g b x U Lx Lr LT LY
r
y
s
e
j
Lf
b
L
+
+
+
µ
µ
µ
µ
+
µ
µ
µ
+
+
+
µ
µ
µ
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
µ
µ
µ
+
+
+
µ
µ
µ
+
+
+
+
µ
µ
+
µ
+n
µ
+
n LY will increase if ds(1µb)/b (that is if the lay-off rate and/or the unemployment benefit are
not too high). The reason is that high lay-off rates and/or high unemployment benefits
(together with the rise of the relative wage) make waiting for a high-paid job more attractive
than being unemployed in the traditional sector.
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either. An increase of the discount rate y leads to the same
situation.
The rate of growth also depends negatively on the share of income
spent on high-tech goods s. Since the production of traditional
products does not grow and traditional and high-tech goods form
imperfect substitutes, a higher share of income spent on high-tech
goods hampers the warranted rate of growth. This leads in principle
to the same situation as described above in the case of a higher r.
The difference is that production shifts away from traditional
towards high-tech goods, which raises employment in the high-tech
sector and decreases employment in the traditional sector.
Unemployment increases, because there are more jobs in the high-
tech sector, so that waiting for a high-paid job becomes more
attractive.
The rate of growth depends positively on the elasticity of
substitution between any two high-tech goods e. A rise of this price
elasticity strengthens the competitive forces on the market for high-
tech goods, so that the price of high-tech goods falls relative to the
price of traditional products. This will decrease employment in the
traditional sector. Ultimately, the effect on LY is ambiguous, because
U increases and LT decreases.14 In the high-tech sector profits
decline due to the increased competitiveness and some firms have to
leave the market. The remaining firms are larger and are thus able
to invest more in knowledge, which raises the rate of growth.
Aggregate employment drops however. This is explained as follows.
A rise of the price elasticity e lowers the mark-up on wage costs and
thus raises unit real labour costs. Tougher competition forces firms
to reduce these costs by paying higher wages in order to invoke
more effort (note that the wage elasticity of effort is greater than
one). The higher relative wage makes people more willing to wait
for a job in the high-tech sector so that the number of unemployed
people increases. Thus, we can conclude that in a free entry
equilibrium, a change of the price elasticity e reveals a trade-off
between aggregate employment and economic growth.
3.3. The blocked entry equilibrium
In an economy with institutionally determined barriers to entry,
economic policy could establish a more competitive environment, so
that new firms can enter the market for high-tech products. To study
the effects of such a policy, we will compare the free entry
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equilibrium (further denoted by subscript f) with the blocked entry
equilibrium (further denoted by subscript b).15
The differences between the two equilibria can be detected in a
straightforward manner by realizing that in the free entry economy
profits are zero which according to the modified Solow condition
(11) and the zero profit condition (19) implies the following
equalities simultaneously
e
eµ1
\
g(ef+a)
ef
\
Lxf+Lrf+Lf
Lxf
.
In the blocked entry economy profits are positive. This implies that
the mark-up over wage costs is higher than the wage elasticity of
effort
e
eµ1
a
g(eb+a)
eb
\
Lxb+Lrb+Lf
Lxb
.
Thus we see that in free entry equilibrium the wage elasticity of
effort (further denoted by W) is higher than in blocked entry
equilibrium. According to the efficiency wage relation, effort is
positively related to the relative wage, so that the inequality between
the mark-up and the wage elasticity of effort implies that in blocked
entry equilibrium the relative wage is higher than in free entry
equilibrium. (Lower relative wages might thus be instrumental in
fostering competitive forces on products markets.) These
inequalities (WfaWb and wbawf) can further be used to give a full
description of the differences between the two equilibria (see Table
2).
Table 2. Free entry equilibrium versus blocked entry equilibrium
Wage elasticity of effort
Relative wage
Rate of growth
Rate of interest
Production labour (firm)
Research labour (firm)
Number of firms
High-tech employment
Traditional employment16
WfaWb
wfswb
gfsgb
rfsrb
LxfsLxb
LrfsLrb
nfanb
LTfaLTb
LYfsLYb
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The results have been derived as follows. For the blocked entry
economy, the planned rate of growth is found after substituting the
eqs. 24 and 26 into eq. 11
gb\(Wbµ1)rbµjLf, (33)
There is a positive relation between gb and rb, as Wba1. Equating
the planned rate of growth with the warranted rate of growth (29)
leads to the equilibrium rate of growth
gb\
jLfµ(Wbµ1)y
s(rµ1)(Wbµ1)µ1
(34)
and the equilibrium rate of interest
rb\
s(rµ1)jLfµy
s(rµ1)(Wbµ1)µ1
. (35)
An important point to make here is that in contrast with the free
entry equilibrium, there is now a relation between the growth rate
and labour market considerations. To be more specific, the blocked
entry model reveals a positive relation between the rate of growth
and the relative wage (which follows from eq. 34 and the notion that
dW/dws0). The eqs. 34 and 35 describe the zero profit equilibrium
if Wb\e/(eµ1).17 As it holds in the positive profit equilibrium that
Wbse/(eµ1), it can be deduced that
gbagf, rbarf.
From the eqs. 24 and 26 it then immediately follows that
LrbaLrf , LxbaLxf .
We can therefore conclude that average firm size decreases when
barriers to entry are released. In addition, it can be shown that (see
Appendix B)
LTfaLTb , LYfsLYb , nfanb.
These results can be explained as follows.
In the blocked entry economy firms make profits. After removing
the barriers to entry, new firms enter the market and try to share in
these profits. As new firms enter the market, firms become smaller
in size and economy-wide traditional fixed cost increase. The share
of fixed costs per firm increases. This makes the ‘‘room’’ for firms
with non-negative profits smaller. As a result, firms cannot afford a
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higher relative wage to invoke more effort, neither can they afford a
larger research department to raise labour productivity. On the
contrary, both the relative wage and the number of research workers
per firm decrease. As a consequence, economic growth is depressed.
Thus, establishing a more competitive environment by removing
barriers to entry improves job prospects in the high-tech sector by
invoking cheaper labour, but this goes at the expense of the
expansion of output. The economy becomes more ‘‘high-tech’’, but
economic growth slows down.
The effect of removing barriers to entry on the rate of
unemployment is ambiguous as can be seen by comparing the
following expression for unemployment in the blocked entry
economy
Ub\
L
1+
1
D
+
1µs
s
w
D
e
eµ1
1
Wb
. (36)
with the corresponding relation for unemployment in the free entry
economy (32). The difference is the ratio between the mark-up and
the wage elasticity of effort (which equals one in the free entry
equilibrium) in the denominator of these equations. ‘‘Moving’’ from
the blocked entry equilibrium towards the free entry equilibrium the
denominator shows two opposite effects. The ratio between the
relative wage and the wage elasticity of effort (w/W) decreases,
which has a positive effect on unemployment and the unemployment
ratio in the high-tech sector (D) decreases, which has a negative
effect on the number of unemployed. In general, it is not possible to
say which effects dominate.18 In any case, moving from blocked
towards free entry reduces the relative wage and the growth rate.
Concluding, the model shows that the move towards free entry is at
best characterized by a trade-off between employment and growth.
In the worst case, both growth and aggregate employment decrease
when moving towards free entry.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a model to study the interaction
between equilibrium unemployment and long-term endogenous
economic growth. In the model, investment in R&D is a major
source of fixed costs and therefore of excess profits in imperfectly
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competitive product markets. Excess profits come about because
new firms cannot enter. Incumbent firms are willing to share excess
profits with their workers. This shows up in a dual economy with
high-paid jobs in the growth-generating high-tech sector and
low-paid jobs in the traditional sector. Robust comparative static
results are obtained for the zero-profit steady-state general
equilibrium of the model. The model is used to evaluate the policy
recommendation in The OECD Jobs Study (cf. OECD 1994) that
economic policy might aim at improving job prospects by both
eliminating wage premia and encouraging output expansion. The
model predicts that establishing a more competitive environment by
removing statutory limitations on competition and other government
intervention in the market process indeed may improve jobs
prospects in the high-tech sector by levelling down the relative wage,
but this goes at the expense of employment in the traditional sector.
The economy becomes more ‘‘high-tech’’, but economic growth is
lower. Therefore, from an economic policy point of view, one has to
outweigh the welfare effects of more high-paid jobs on the one hand
with the welfare effects of a lower rate of economic growth and less
low-paid jobs on the other hand. From a macroeconomic
perspective, inducing more entry by firms leads in the best case to
lower unemployment. It can however not be precluded that both
economic growth and employment decrease.
Appendix A. Producer behaviour of high-tech firms
On the producer side of the model we assume that high-tech firms
compete monopolistically. Each firm, producing a unique brand of
the high-tech good, is assumed to maximize its present discounted
value Vi which yields
max Vi\h
l
0
[xit pxitµ(Lxit+Lrit+Lfi)wxi]eµrt dt,
Lri, Lxi, wxi
subject to
xi\hieiLxi,
ei\µa+c C
wxi
wYD
g
,
h˙i\jKiLri,
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xi\XA
pxi
PXB
µe
.
The ‘‘current value’’ Hamiltonian corresponding to this optimization
problem is
H\xit pxitµ(Lxit+Lrit+Lfi)wxi+phitjKiLri,
where phi is the shadow price of the level of technology (hi). This
shadow-price is a measure of the marginal value of an additional
unit of h for the firm.
The first order conditions of this maximization problem are
qH
qwxi
\hiLxi
qei
qwxi
pxi
eµ1
e
µ(Lxi+Lri+Lfi)\0,
which yields the modified Solow-condition,
qH
qLxi
\eihi pxi
eµ1
e
µwxi\0,
which shows that firms engage in mark-up pricing,
qH
qLri
\µwxi+phijKi\0,
which yields optimal R&D input, and
µ
qH
qh
\µeiLxi pxi
eµ1
e
µphi j 
qKi
qhi
Lri\p˙hiµrphi.
Rewriting these first order conditions a little (thereby invoking the
symmetry assumption and assuming K\h), yields eqns. 11–14 in the
text.
Appendix B. The allocation of labour
In the blocked entry economy the number of firms is fixed. This
number can be expressed in terms of the parameters of the model in
the same manner as the number of firms in the free entry economy
is derived. A full closed solution of the blocked entry model is
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intractable, but we can compare the two economies in a qualitative
sense by applying the following inequalities19
WfaWb, Wi=
g(ei+a)
ei
, i\f, b,
DfsDb, Di=
d(wiµb)
1µb
,
wfswb, (wia1).
It follows that20
nfanb, ni\
[s(rµ1) (Wiµ1)µ1)]L
Cs(rµ1)Lfµ
y
jDCwi
1µs
s
e
eµ1
+(1+Di)WiD
,
LTfaLTb, LTi\
L
wi
Wi
1µs
s
e
eµ1
+1+Di
,
LYi\
1µs
s
e
eµ1
L
1µs
s
e
eµ1
+
(1+Di)
wi
Wi
.
The denominator shows two opposite effects. The ratio between the
wage elasticity of effort and the relative wage increases, which has a
negative effect on LY and the unemployment ratio in the high-tech
sector decreases, which has a positive effect on LY. Writing the
second term of the denominator in terms of the relative wage and
determining the derivative of this term with respect to the relative
wage it is unambiguously true that
LYfsLYb if ds
1µb
b
Note that we saw this condition before (see the footnote in Table 1).
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Notes
*We would like to thank Theo van de Klundert and Sjak Smulders for useful
comments on an earlier version of this paper. Of course the usual disclaimer applies.
1 Akerlof and Yellen (1986) and Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) provide good
overviews.
2 All the following maximizations are for single consumers. Therefore we omit the
consumer indices. Aggregation over all consumers finally yields exactly the equations
as stated in the main text.
3 This assumption of a Cobb-Douglas preference function is needed to guarantee
a balanced growth equilibrium.
4 Empirically, the relation between the operation of an efficiency wage relation and
some characteristics of the sector like the size of the firm, capital intensity or kind
of competition has been investigated by e.g. Krueger and Summers (1988), Brown
and Medoff (1989), Arai (1994) and Gera and Grenier (1994). They find evidence
for a significant wage premium for those people working in large firms and in firms
that operate under imperfect competition.
5 In case knowledge is not completely internal to the firm, the incentive for firms
to engage in research is lowered, as the firm cannot fully appropriate the benefits
that are generated through the research. Thereby, one gets into a situation with a
lower intensity of research (and therefore a lower growth rate) than in the case with
no knowledge spillovers.
6 In this approach, we determine the input of research labour on the basis of
optimizing behaviour of the firm. To this approach, serious objections can be raised.
The future revenues of doing R&D are, almost by definition, inherently uncertain.
The use of a perfect foresight model certainly is not able to capture this important
aspect of R&D properly. On average, however, it seems justified to assume that the
input of more labour into the R&D process will lead to a higher output of
knowledge. An alternative would be the use of a rule of thumb for R&D input.
7 Bulow and Summers (1986) remark that the assumption of workers queueing for
high-wage jobs may be justified both theoretically and empirically.
8 Of course, one could endogenize the lay-off rate, but for the purpose of this
paper this point is not crucial.
9 Following for example Johnson and Layard (1986) the option to wait can be
written as
VU\h
l
0
[eµftbwY+(1µeµft)wx]eµrtdt\
1
f+r 
bwY+
f
(f+r)r 
wx,
where f is the probability per unit of time that an unemployed person gets a job in
the high-tech sector. The other option is not to wait, to accept and hold a job in the
traditional sector continuously which yields
VY\h
l
0
wYeµrtdt\
wY
r
.
The labour market is in equilibrium if f\dLT/U, which comes down to
U
LT
\
d(wµ1)
r(1µb)
.
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This specification turns out not to affect the results of the growth block of the
model, but complicates the analysis of the allocation of labour over sectors.
10 Empirically, this seems to be the relevant case (cf. King and Rebelo, 1993).
11 These results, which stem from the growth block of the free entry model,
correspond with the findings of Smulders and Van de Klundert (1995). Following
these authors it is easy to show that the introduction of a more extended knowledge
base in R&D activities does not yield important additional insights. In the following
formulation
h˙i\jKiLri, Ki\h¯
ah1µai, h¯\
1
n 
+
n
iµ1
hi, 0Ras1,
research may also benefit from spillovers from the knowledge developed for other
products. The fruits of R&D are in other words not completely internal to the firm.
Repeating the procedure described in the text yields
g\
(eµ1)jLfµy
[s(rµ1)+a]+1µe
.
The only difference with the equations in the text is the addition of a to the
composite parameter s(rµ1).
12 The solution for LT, LY and n (see Appendix B) follows from eq. 19 and the eqs.
A and B in subsection 3.1. (Lr is found with eqs. 24 and 30 and Lx with eqs. 26 and
31.)
13 To keep the equation tractable, we did not substitute the equilibrium relative
wage (21) out.
14 LY will increase if the lay-off rate and/or the unemployment benefit are not too
high. See the footnote in Table 1.
15 Alternatively, we could solve the whole model by determining the demand for
effort from the side of the firm as a function of its price (the relative wage). This
relation follows from combining eqs. 2, 10, 11, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23 and 29. This required
effort can be confronted with the supply of effort (eq. 9). This yields the equilibrium
level of effort and the equilibrium relative wage. All other endogenous variables can
then be derived in a straightforward manner. However, this way of solving the model
does not yield a closed form solution due to non-linearity. One thereafter has to
resort to numerical simulations. Qualitative results can however be obtained and we
concentrate on that in the main text.
16 This result holds unambiguously if ds(1µb)/b. Note that we saw this condition
before in Table 1.
17 Drawing the planned rate of growth and the warranted rate of growth in a
picture like Figure 2 reveals that an economically meaningful blocked entry
equilibrium is obtained if jLf/yaWbµ1a1/(s(rµ1)). Note that if Wb\e/(eµ1) the
conditions for an economically meaningful zero profit equilibrium are replicated.
18 This is seen from the condition for UfsUb that looks like
gcwg+
1µs
s
e
eµ1 
[ag(bµw)+b(µa+cwg)]a0.
19 Note that Wf\e/(eµ1) and wf is determined by eq. 21, so that a full closed
solution of the free entry model is obtained. Given these results, the comparative
static results (Table 1) can be obtained when taking into account the stability
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condition and the condition that is needed to ensure that the growth rate is positive
as mentioned in the text.
20 The integer problem with respect to the number of firms is ignored to simplify
the analysis.
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